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Saving Arnavutköy: The Contemporary
Cultural Politics Of Turkey
Rogelio Miñana
I don’t want to be a tree, I want to be its meaning.
Orhan Pamuk, My Name Is Red

C

an a tree speak? Can a dog talk? Can a man narrate his own
beheading? According to Orhan Pamuk’s novel My Name Is Red (1998),
in sixteenth-century Istanbul they could. The most internationally
acclaimed Turkish novel of recent times focuses on the artistic process
itself. In the novel, the Sultan commissions a group of artists to undertake the illumination of a book celebrating his realm, but asks them to
employ European-style artwork. Affronting the rules of Islam, which
prohibit the use of representational images and allow only figurative ornamentations, these artists paint following the Venetian dictates
of perspective and realism. Soon after their project secretly begins, a
series of murders occur.
But the power of art does not only determine the fate of the characters in the novel. The narrative style is also influenced by the art
of Islamic miniaturism. Instead of using a conventional omniscient
narrator, Orhan Pamuk fragments his story into a myriad of narrators
who, like symbolic figures in a miniature, narrate events from their
own (often non-realistic, highly symbolic) perspectives. Thus, the first
narrative miniature of the novel is told by a corpse: “I am a corpse” are
his first words (3). Later, a talking dog challenges the reader when he
claims, “I’m a dog, and because you humans are less rational beasts
than I, you’re telling yourselves, ‘Dogs don’t talk.’ Nevertheless, you
seem to believe a story in which corpses speak and characters use
words they couldn’t possibly know. Dogs do speak, but only to those
who know how to listen” (11). In similar fashion, a man tells of his own
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beheading (404), two painted dervishes speak to their readers/viewers
(307), and a painted tree confesses its contentment in not being realistic, and “not because I fear that if I’d been thus depicted all the dogs in
Istanbul would assume I was a real tree and piss on me: I don’t want to
be a tree, I want to be its meaning” (51).
According to Pamuk’s interpretation of sixteenth-century Istanbul,
art and religion are intimately connected. As one of the master illuminators in the novel states, “Through our colors, paints, art and love,
we remember that Allah had commanded us to ‘See!’ To know is to
remember that you’ve seen. To see is to know without remembering”
(76). If art is a means to know the world, we can better appreciate
Allah’s creation only through art: “Allah created this earthly realm
so that, above all, it might be seen. Afterward, He provided us with
words so we might share and discuss with one another what we’ve
seen. We mistakenly assumed that these stories arose out of words and
that illustrations were painted in service of these stories. Quite the contrary, painting is the act of seeking out Allah’s memories and seeing the
world as He sees the world” (79).
But as the Prophet commanded, art should never compete with
Allah’s creation, and therefore should never use representational, realistic images. Words and art must depict the world through a symbolic discourse, since only when “the world had been newly created,”
words carried their meaning within themselves: “you’d say ‘horse,’
then mount it and ride away” (386). Art and words are codes that must
be deciphered to interpret their hidden meanings, lost shortly after the
creation of all things. According to Pamuk, the power of symbolism in
art is thus an essential part of Turkish cultural and even religious heritage. And as one of the main characters in My Name Is Red affirms, the
power of miniatures is such that “if you stare long enough your mind
enters the time of the painting” (405).
Entering the meaning of art is certainly an inescapable (and pleasant, I must add) activity in Turkey. In a country where East and West
meet, and where ancient civilizations from all across Europe and Asia
have left traces of their wealth and traditions, one could argue that the
history of Turkey is written in its architecture. Turkish buildings, like
dogs and trees in My Name Is Red, do indeed talk. Hittites, Mongols,
Greeks and Romans, Kurds, Armenians, and Ottomans, to name only
a few, established the physical foundation of their respective cultures
by means of their unique architecture. The most recent layer in Tur-
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key’s history thus far, the Kemalist republic, continues to leave its own
imprint in the public buildings erected after 1923.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of the Republic of Turkey that
ended centuries of Ottoman rule in 1923, initiated a process of modernization based on Westernization and secularism. As part of this
movement, Ataturk and his followers created a cult of personality that
sharply contrasts with Islamic iconoclastic principles.1 Even today,
chances are that every square and public space (and even restaurants
and businesses) displays an image, painting, photo, figure, or statue of
Ataturk. Keenly aware of the power of art, Kemal was savvy in his use
of painting, sculpture, cinema, writing, and of course architecture to
contribute to his main cause: the consolidation of the new republic.
Ataturk and his followers soon realized that architecture was essential in winning the hearts and minds of Turkish nationals who, after
centuries of Ottoman rule, were embarking on the construction of a
nationalistic, modern, secular state. As Resat Kasaba explains, “the
underlying assumption was that once the environment was altered,
the behavior of individuals could be easily molded and made to fit
the requirements of the newly created circumstances” (24).2 In fact,
as Sibel Bozdogan points out, “the new architecture effectively legitimized the architect as a ‘cultural leader’ or ‘agent of civilization’ with
a passionate sense of mission to dissociate the republic from an Ottoman and Islamic past.”3 The new architects broke with previous architectural and artistic trends in two key senses. First, they looked for
inspiration in European cubism and modernism with a strong Classical-style component, acknowledging Greek and Roman influences
over Islamic, Ottoman ones.4 Later, they developed the “Milli Mimari”
or new nationalistic architecture, which stressed the idea that the Turks
were the originators of modern civilization, while still recognizing Hittite, Classical, and even Islamic influences.5 No matter what the new
architecture looked like, it certainly required both massive construction (the capital city of Ankara being the best example), and grandscale processes of destruction and reconstruction. This was the case in
Istanbul, especially during the 1950s under the personal supervision
of Adnan Menderes (a sort of Turkish Robert Moses of the time) when
“the cutting of wide thoroughfares and traffic arteries through historical fabrics” became a common practice in cities such as Istanbul.6 It
was only after the 1980s that a group of architects and urbanists began
to react to what Bozdogan describes as “the austerity and paternalism
of official modernism,”7 but without truly opposing the dictates of the
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government to advance their process of modernization and renewal
in Turkey. Only in recent years have architecture and urban construction ignited an international movement to oppose the destruction of
Istanbul’s Arnavutköy neighborhood in order to build a third bridge
over the Bosphorus strait.
The nationalistic and religious implications of official Kemalist
architecture cannot be dismissed. Under Ataturk’s direction, the First
Historical Congress of Turkey took place in Ankara in July of 1932.
According to Resat Kasaba, during that “historical” congress there
was “no mention of the ethnic diversity of the Ottoman Empire and no
discussion of what had happened to its Christian subjects.”8 The modernizing efforts of Kemalist architecture, especially during the first
decades of the republic, emphasized the Classical, Greco-Roman style
while making no artistic reference to the Christian Orthodox tradition
of the Byzantine period. As Ataturk was secularizing Turkish political
practices, religious minorities were directly affected by the strife the
country had suffered (and would suffer again) during the tumultuous
first thirty years of the twentieth century. Most Turkish ethnic and religious communities, if not all, have suffered their own trials since the
end of the nineteenth century. Even within the Islamic majority, Sunnis
and Alevi Muslims clashed during the 1960s riots in Istanbul.9 And
the Christian minority in particular (Armenians, Greeks, Albanians)
was subject to a series of political measures and popular dislike that,
to offer but one example, slashed the population of Greeks in Istanbul
from 100,000 circa 1923 to a few thousand in 1997.10 The forced migrations after the Turkish-Greek war in January of 1923, the Capital Tax in
1942, the consequences of the Cyprus conflict for Greek Turks in 1955
(attacks on Greeks in Istanbul) and 1964 (12,000 more Greek Turks
expelled) all contributed to the tensions between the government and
Turkish Christian minorities.11 Even though Christians were not officially forced to convert to the “official faith” (Sunni Hanefi Mez Heb),
Christian conversions increased as tensions and clashes became more
apparent.12 By the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire
acted ruthlessly against Christian minorities in Trabzon and Ankara.13
For Çaglar Keyder, the deportation and massacre of Armenians in
Anatolia (nine-tenths of the population was eradicated) and of the
Pontus Greeks on the Black Sea coast still provoke “embarrassment
and shame.”14 By 1997, the Armenian population in Istanbul (approximately 30,000–35,000) found itself under political pressure because of
terrorist attacks by Armenian radical groups against Turkish interests
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abroad during the 1980s, and for the popular belief that Armenians
sympathized with the PKK (the Kurdish independence group) during
the 1990s. The assumption was that both the Kurds and the Armenians
favored the disintegration of the republic.15
*****
If buildings talk in Turkey, as we might assert from Orhan Pamuk’s talking corpses, dogs, and trees, there is no doubt that Turkish urbanism
and architecture reflect the clashes and tensions between the government and minorities. In fact, one of the most prominent manifestations
of the tensions between Kemalists and the Christian minority during
the 1980s was the destruction of numerous Byzantine historical monuments.16 The actions of the Turkish government prompted Patriarch
Demitrius I to complain to former President George H. W. Bush in
1990, seeking international sympathy for the preservation of Christian
monuments in Turkey.
In recent years, Turkish cultural politics have been affected by the
country’s aspirations to join the European Union. Early on, Brussels
imposed a number of conditions for giving Turkey a starting date for
the negotiation process toward accession. One requirement is a clear
commitment by the Turkish government to respect the rights of ethnic
and religious minorities. In fact, as recently as June of 2004, the statecontrolled television broadcasted in Armenian, Kurdish, and other
minority languages for the first time.
In another key shift, several governmental decisions affecting historical sites and monuments are being challenged by locals. For example,
conservationists are fighting to stop a dam project that would destroy
the eastern medieval town of Hasankeyf. In addition, the government
intends to transport the ancient mosaics found in Zeugma, a Roman
site on the Euphrates now submerged by a dam, to Istanbul; however,
locals are protesting this decision in an effort to keep the mosaics in
the area. It is in Istanbul itself where the tensions between the central
government and locals have acquired a more significant dimension
regarding the magnitude of the protests and their international repercussions. The Ankara proposal to build a third bridge over the Bosphorus, which would require the destruction of practically the entire
neighborhood of Arnavutköy, located on the European side of Istanbul,
has been met with a vigorous and so far successful civic movement to
preserve the area and its unique architecture.
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H. H. Günhan Danisman and Ismail Üstün recount the convoluted
history of this multi-ethnic neighborhood, which covers a period of
more than 1,500 years. Throughout seven stages of migration, “the
ratio of 90% Christian to 10% Moslem at the beginning of the twentieth
century becomes 95% Moslem to 5% Christian at the end of the century.”17 First called Hestai, Arnavutköy, it became a notorious place of
worship during the Byzantine period, when it was known as Promotu
or Anaplous. The name Arnavutköy is first recorded in 1568, most
likely due to Albanian (Arnavut means Albanian in Turkish) settlement
in the area after Fatih Sultan Mehmet conceded sovereignty to Albania
(Altinisik). Predominantly Greek from then on, Jewish and Armenian
settlers also inhabited the town for most of the pre-20th-century era.
Following the turmoil and forced migrations of 1923, 1942, 1955, and
1964, the town lost most of its Christian population, yet managed to
preserve (albeit in a precarious state) its unique architecture. According
to the Armenian Patriarchate, Arnavutköy is the last standing example
of “the famous wooden-house architecture which characterized the
rich style of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is one of the last
areas to support a functional Greek school and church, and contains
the ruins of an ancient, and yet undocumented synagogue and other
sites.” The Decree 9483 of the High Council of Monuments claims that
in Arnavutköy there are 38 monumental constructions, 292 examples
of civil architecture, 5 natural green conservation areas, 42 Yalis or
waterfront houses from the Ottoman era, 30 monumental trees, and
several retaining walls and garden walls. In fact, the government has
awarded this town protection by special decree.18 Currently, approximately 5,300 people live in the village, including 250 ethnic Greeks,
Armenians, Jews and the U.S. Consul General,19 as well as the pop star
Tarkan, among other famous residents.20
In late 1998, the Highways Department of the central government
announced controversial plans to build a third bridge across the waterway, which would “devastate the neighborhood’s important architectural and historic fabric.”21 Even though the government has never put
forward a formal proposal on the Bosphorus bridge between Kanidili,
on the Asian side, and Arnavutköy, several high officials have hinted
that the beginning of construction could be imminent. Faced with this
prospect, the people of Arnavutköy quickly mobilized and attracted
rare international attention for their cause. Conservationist efforts claim
not only that the architectural and historical heritage of Arnavutköy is
at risk,22 but also that the third bridge will not solve traffic congestion
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problems. In 35 points, the association in defense of Arnavutköy presents the case that a third bridge would increase the number of vehicles,
not passengers, that cross the Bosphorus every day. Traffic-related pollution, construction costs, and the practical destruction of Kandili and
Arnavutköy on both sides of the Bosphorus are, according to conservationists, enough reasons to favor the construction of an underwater
railway tunnel rather than another Bosphorus bridge.
Saving Arnavutköy is, in sum, a case in point in contemporary
Turkish cultural politics. A country constantly struggling to keep up
with the European Union’s incessant demands, Turkey is facing a new
period in which the political class needs to be more attentive to the
whole of Turkish society, including its minorities. In the case of Arnavutköy, environmentalist concerns and the preservation of the architectural heritage of the Christian minority go hand in hand with an effort
to confront a government that has historically (especially throughout
the 20th century) been hostile toward the ethnic inhabitants of the
area. As the Armenian Patriarchate notes, “the fate of Arnavutköy,
and the disregard with which the government approaches this important historical site, ultimately reflects to Turkish citizens, visitors, and
architectural historians everywhere, the fate of our society as a whole.”
Turkey’s image within and beyond its borders is at stake.
*****
The international press has echoed this unusual development in contemporary cultural politics in Turkey, where environmental, artistic,
and minority-rights concerns all converge in the struggle to save Arnavutköy. The political situation in Turkey has not traditionally encouraged resistance to the government. As late as 1999, as Amberin Zaman
noted in the Los Angeles Times, “Turks are reluctant to join in any organized challenge to the state. Those who do, be they Islamists seeking
the right to wear head scarves in public buildings or Kurds demanding
schooling in their own language, usually face arrest.” In that sense,
Zaman concludes, “The ‘Say No to the Bridge’ campaign reflects a new
willingness among Turks to stand up to the government.” The efforts
directed at saving Arnavutköy do not mark the first time civic protests have delayed a state-proposed project, such as the construction
of power plants; however, the Arnavutköy movement possibly constitutes the first objections leveled at a large-scale public works project in
a nation where “the power of the state has always been strong and all
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but unquestioned.”23 The significance of Arnavutköy thus goes beyond
the struggle to save the singular architecture of the neighborhood. As
Ozen Danisman, one of the leaders of the Anavutköy Citizens Initiative
states, “We [local residents] became aware of our own power—that we
are citizens and we have our own rights.”24
The consequences of the campaign to save Arnavutköy are therefore
far-reaching and may even help reassure the European Union of the
truly democratic nature of the Turkish state. On March 7, 1999, the
former Minister of Public Works and Housing, Mr. Ali Iliksoy, was
expected to attend a meeting between high-ranking officials of the
Ministry of Transport and the residents of Arnavutköy. Mr. Iliksoy had
to postpone his visit, but the briefing still took place in the Sports Club,
marking “probably the first time ever that high officials of any ministry
in Turkey took ordinary citizens seriously to give them a briefing.”25
For that reason, and perhaps with the help of the European Union’s
pressure to open up the Turkish government to its people, “the concept
of NGOs and citizen’s initiatives such as the Arnavutköy initiative are,
no doubt, the rising values of a coming era.”26
Ultimately, saving Arnavutköy is also a campaign to strengthen and
renew democratic practices in Turkey. From a previous, rather authoritarian politics of culture, Turkish citizens and the government are moving towards a different political culture, in which decisions are openly
challenged, causes are championed, and the nation’s architectural patrimony is hopefully saved. 
•
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Notes
1. Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building, pp. 283–85.
2. The examples of what Deniz Kandiyoti calls “cultural nationalism” are numerous,
from architecture to the emancipation of women from Islamic fundamentalism, which
the new Republic employed as a hallmark of secularization. (p. 125.)
3. Bozdogan, “The Predicament,” p. 138.
4. Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building, chap. 1–5, pp. 1–238.
5. Ibid., chap. 6, pp. 240–93.
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6. Bozdogan, “The Predicament,” pp. 140–141; pictures of these massive urban renewals
appear in pages 142–144.
7. Ibid., p. 147.
8. Kasaba, p. 29.
9. Poulton, pp. 262–65.
10. Ibid., pp. 272–78.
11. Ibid.
12. Deringil, pp. 68, 84.
13. Ibid., pp. 78–81.
14. Keyder, p. 44.
15. The controversy over the Armenian massacre continues. Last year, the CanadianArmenian filmmaker Atom Egoyam premiered his movie Ararat, in which he denounces
Turkish political and ethnic violence against Armenians. The Turkish government
reacted by setting up a webpage, linked to the official Ministry of Tourism page, denying some of Egoyam’s claims and contextualizing the Turkish-Armenian conflict from its
own perspective. See Poulton, pp. 275–78.
16. Poulton, p. 274.
17. Danisman and Ustün, p. 3.
18. Aslaneli.
19. Zaman.
20. Aslaneli.
21. Danisman and Üstün, p. 1.
22. Heritage at Risk.
23. Kinzer.
24. Moore.
25. Alemdar, p. 4.
26. Ibid., p. 5.

Bibliography
Alemdar, Nigar. “Save Arnavutköy.” Roberts College Quarterly (Spring 1999): 2–5.
Altinisik, Hasan. “Arnavutköy Residents Don’t Want the Third Bridge.” Turkish Daily
News. 14 June 2002.
Aslaneli, Hakan. “A Resounding ‘No’ to the Third Bridge.” Turkish Daily News. 30
November 1999.
Bozdogan, Sibel, and Resat Kasaba, eds. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.
Bozdogan, Sibel. Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early
Republic. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.
―――. “The Predicament of Modernism in Turkish Architectural Culture: An Overview.” Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, pp. 133–56.

249

